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HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
Survey period occurred through judicial decisions.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Texas Supreme Court was called upon to venture once more into
the thicket of the Texas courts' jurisdiction over cases involving the free
exercise of religion in Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert.1 The
plaintiff brought suit against her church and various individuals for,
among other claims, assault, battery, and false imprisonment, arising out
of several encounters in which she alleged she was forcibly restrained by
church members and suffered physical and emotional injuries. The de-
* B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University School of Law. Partner,
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1. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
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fendants moved to dismiss the "lawsuit as an unconstitutional burden on
their religious practices, describing the litigation as a dispute regarding
how services should be conducted within a church, including the practice
of 'laying on of hands." 2
The supreme court held that, "[b]ecause providing a remedy for the
very real, but religiously motivated emotional distress in this case would
require us to take sides in what is essentially a religious controversy," it
lacked jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.3 Although the First Amend-
ment did not protect the church from claims of physical injury, the court
concluded that the case was not about the "scrapes and bruises" plaintiff
sustained during the events in question, but rather her subsequent psy-
chological and emotional injuries.4 Thus, for jurisdictional purposes, the
supreme court was unable to distinguish the claims in this case from a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which it had previ-
ously held would necessarily and impermissibly "require an inquiry into
the truth or falsity of religious beliefs."'5
The Texas Supreme Court addressed an unusual question involving a
district court's subject matter jurisdiction over condemnation actions in
PR Investments and Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. State.6 In this case, the
Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) changed its road design
plans after the special commissioners made their award, but before the
trial de novo in the county court. The property owner complained that
the county court's jurisdiction in condemnation cases is "appellate" in
nature, and it therefore should not have considered the changed plan that
was not before the special commissioners. 7 The supreme court disagreed,
holding that the county court was not divested of jurisdiction.8 While the
trial court proceeding is appellate in the sense that the special commis-
sioners first consider the matter, its review is by trial de novo, and the
governing property code provision states the trial court shall "try the case
in the same manner as other civil causes."9 Moreover, the supreme court
rejected the landowner's alternative argument that the trial court had dis-
cretion to dismiss, stating that a court possessed of jurisdiction must gen-
erally exercise it.O°
Cadle Co. v. Bray involved a suit to revive a dormant judgment."1 The
defendant argued that such a suit was a scire facias claim that had to be
2. Id. at 5 (internal quotations omitted).
3. Id. at 13.
4. Id. at 8.
5. Id. at 9 (quoting Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 682 (Tex. 1996)). In dissent,
Chief Justice Jefferson noted that the plaintiff alleged she suffered physical injuries, and
the jury's award was for unsegregated physical pain and mental anguish. Id. at 15 (Jeffer-
son, C.J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent argued, "at its core the case is about secular, inten-
tional tort claims squarely within our jurisdiction." Id.
6. 251 S.W.3d 472 (Tex. 2008).
7. Id. at 475.
8. Id. at 476.
9. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.018(b) (Vernon 2004)).
10. Id. at 479.
11. 264 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
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filed in the same court and, because the clerk assigned the suit to a differ-
ent county court, subject matter jurisdiction was lacking even after it was
transferred, at plaintiff's request, to the county court that issued the origi-
nal judgment. The First District Court of Appeals in Houston rejected
this argument, holding that plaintiff's pleading included an express state-
ment regarding the proper court for the case to be assigned to, and the
failure of the clerk to assign the case to that court originally did not de-
prive it of subject matter jurisdiction. 12
In White v. Robinson, citizens who sponsored a referendum proposition
brought suit, after the proposition was passed by voters, seeking a decla-
ration that it was valid and must be enforced. 13 The Fourteenth District
Court of Appeals in Houston held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
sue. 14 The court reasoned that the "dispute ha[s] moved beyond the elec-
tion process," and the referendum sponsors' legal interest in the subject
matter was now no different than that of any other voter, taxpayer, or
citizen. 15 Moreover, the court held that a provision in the proposition
that purported to grant standing to any citizen who voted on it was inef-
fective because municipalities, whether acting through their legislative
bodies or by citizen referenda, may not confer standing by legislation.1 6
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
In Kao Holdings, L.P. v. Young, the Texas Supreme Court was called
upon to construe two statutes that seemingly authorized the entry of a
judgment against individual partners who have been served with process
in a suit against the partnership. 17 Section 17.022 of the Texas Civil Prac-
tices and Remedies Code (TCPR) provides that: "Citation served on one
member of a partnership authorizes a judgment against the partnership
and the partner actually served."1 8 Similarly, section 3.05(c) of the Texas
Revised Partnership Act (TRPA) states: "A judgment against a partner-
ship is not by itself a judgment against a partner, but a judgment may be
entered against a partner who has been served with process in a suit
against the partnership."' 9 The supreme court held, however, that
neither of these statutes allows for a judgment to be rendered against a
partner who has not been named as a defendant, even if he has been
served.20 The supreme court explained that TCPR 17.022 dates back de-
cades before partnerships were recognized as separate entities that could
be sued and, therefore, was intended to authorize a judgment against the
partnership when an individual partner is sued and served, not vice
12. Id. at 213.
13. 260 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. granted).
14. Id. at 466.
15. Id. at 472-73.
16. Id. at 473.
17. 261 S.W.3d 60 (Tex. 2008).
18. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.022 (Vernon 2008).
19. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.05(c) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
20. See Young, 261 S.W.3d at 62.
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versa. 21 The purpose of TRPA 3.05 is less clear, the supreme court ac-
knowledged, but in its view that provision also means only that service of
process is necessary, not sufficient.2 2 Thus, the supreme court has now
made clear that "[p]artners against whom judgment is sought should be
both named and served so that they are on notice of their potential liabil-
ity and will have an opportunity to contest their personal liability for the
asserted partnership obligation. '23
In Cebcor Service Corp. v. Landscape Design & Construction, Inc., the
plaintiffs sued Consolidated Employment Benefits Corporation and
served the Secretary of State under the long-arm statute.24 When no an-
swer was filed, plaintiffs moved for a default. On the day of the default
hearing, plaintiffs filed an amended petition that was nearly identical to
the original petition, except it alleged that the defendant was Consoli-
dated Employment Benefit Service Corporation a/k/a Cebcor Service
Corporation. No party was served with the amended petition, and the
trial court awarded a default judgment. Cebcor Service Corporation filed
a bill of review several years later, arguing that it was never served with
process. Following a jury trial, the trial court declared the judgment valid
on the ground that Cebcor Service Corporation was the alter ego of Con-
solidated Employment Benefits Corporation. The Dallas Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, holding that service of process on one entity constitutes
valid service on its alter ego as well.2 5
In order to reverse a default judgment on a restricted appeal based on
a defect in service of process, "the error complained of must be apparent
on the face of the record. '26 Two cases decided by the Dallas Court of
Appeals came to opposite conclusions regarding whether this require-
ment was satisfied in cases involving seemingly minor defects. In Good-
man v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., the appellant complained that the
verification on the return of service did not show strict compliance with
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure (TRCP) 107,27 because the notary's ac-
knowledgment did not recite that "she personally knew the process
server" or "had satisfactory evidence of his identity. '28 The court of ap-
peals rejected this argument, reasoning that TRCP 107 requires verifica-
tion to "establish the truth of the information in the return, not to
establish the identity of the person signing the return. ' 29 In Lytle v. Cun-
ningham, on the other hand, the court vacated a default judgment where
21. See id. at 62-63.
22. Id. at 62-64.
23. Id. at 64.
24. 270 S.W.3d 328, 330 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 17.044(b) (Vernon 2008).
25. Cebcor, 270 S.W.3d at 333.
26. See Goodman v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 260 S.W.3d 699, 701 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2008, no pet.).
27. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107.
28. Goodman, 260 S.W.3d at 701-02 (citing TEX. CiV. PRAC & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 121.005 (Vernon 2005) (detailing requirements of notary's acknowledgment)).
29. Id. at 702.
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the petition alleged that service could be made upon "Mr. Chris Lytle,"
but the return recited that service had been made by delivery to "Christo-
pher Lytle." 30 The court held that it could not tell if these were the same
or different persons, and that the difference between "Chris" and "Chris-
topher" was not a "slight variance" similar to the "omission of a middle
initial.'"31
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Haaksman v. Diamond Offshore (Bermuda) Ltd. presented "the novel
question of whether or not a trial court presented with a foreign-money
judgment must establish in personam jurisdiction over the judgment
debtor prior to domesticating the judgment. '3 2 Finding no relevant Texas
authority, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston followed
the lead of courts in other states in holding that in personam jurisdiction
is not required under either the judgment recognition statute or the
United States Constitution. 33 The court of appeals also rejected the judg-
ment-debtor's argument that, if personal jurisdiction is lacking, the judg-
ment creditor must present evidence that the judgment debtor has
property in Texas subject to execution. 34 The court reasoned that, even if
the judgment debtor does not currently have property in Texas, the judg-
ment creditor should be granted recognition of his judgment so that he
can later pursue enforcement if and when it comes to pass that the judg-
ment debtor is maintaining assets in this state. 35
Langston, Sweet & Freese, P.A. v. Ernster demonstrates that establish-
ing personal jurisdiction over a partnership does not, without more, es-
tablish jurisdiction over each of its partners. 36 Richard Freese, a partner
in the defendant law firm that had entered into a fee sharing agreement
involving claims originating in Texas, among other places, argued that he
individually had no minimum contacts with Texas. The Beaumont Court
of Appeals agreed, holding that the law firm's contacts could not be im-
puted to Freese for personal jurisdictional purposes, regardless of
whether he might ultimately be liable for the partnership's obligations. 37
IV. VENUE
In In re Transcontinental Realty Investors, Inc., the Texas Supreme
Court considered whether "an amendment to the permissive venue stat-
ute ... should be interpreted to eliminate businesses from" the ambit of
30. 261 S.W.3d 837, 839-40 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
31. Id. at 840 (citing Westcliffe, Inc. v. Bear Creek Constr., Ltd., 105 S.W.3d 286, 290
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.)).
32. 260 S.W.3d 476, 478 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
33. Id. at 479-80.
34. Id. at 480.
35. Id. at 481.
36. 255 S.W.3d 402 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2008, pet. denied).
37. Id. at 410.
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"every venue statute that refers to where a party 'resides.'" 38 In this
case, the North Texas Municipal Water District filed suit against Trans-
continental in Kaufman County, seeking to condemn a 30-foot easement
on land located in both Kaufman and Dallas Counties. Section 21.013 of
the Texas Property Code requires that condemnation suits be filed where
the owner "resides" if the property is at least partly located in the county
of residence. 39 Accordingly, Transcontinental moved to transfer venue to
Dallas County on the basis that its principal place of business and regis-
tered agent are in Dallas County, and it had no offices in Kaufman
County. The Water District argued that corporations do not "reside" in
any particular county, because they have no residence. Specifically, the
Water District claimed that the supreme court's prior holding that the
registered office and agent "shall constitute a statutory place of residence
of the corporation," was no longer controlling "because the Legislature
amended the permissive-venue statute in 1983 to limit [the] 'residence'
[provision] to natural persons."' 40 The supreme court disagreed and held
that "when the Legislature amended the permissive-venue statute to dis-
tinguish between a natural person's 'residence' and a business's 'principal
office,"' it did not intend "to eliminate corporations and other legal enti-
ties from all statutes that refer to a place where one 'resides.'" 4 1
In In re Team Rocket, L.P., the Texas Supreme Court considered
whether a plaintiff, who is denied his initial choice of venue, can subse-
quently refile in a third county after nonsuiting the case in the transferee
county.42 Here, the plaintiff initially filed his lawsuit in Harris County
and the defendant moved to transfer venue to Williamson County. The
trial court granted the defendant's motion to transfer venue, and the
plaintiff then nonsuited the case and immediately filed the same claims
against the same defendant in Fort Bend County. Defendant once again
moved to transfer venue to Williamson County, which was denied by the
Fort Bend County trial court. On mandamus, the supreme court held
"that only one venue determination may be made" in a civil proceeding
and that TRCP 8743 "specifically prohibits changes in venue after ...
[that] ... initial venue ruling."' 44 Otherwise, parties would be allowed to
forum shop, a practice that the supreme court has repeatedly
condemned. 45
In In re Boehme, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston
considered whether a party had waived its contractual forum selection
clause.46 The court first noted that when analyzing the issue of waiver,
38. 271 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tex. 2008).
39. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.013 (Vernon 2004).
40. Transcontinental, 271 S.W.3d at 271 (quoting Ward v. Fairway Operating Co., 364
S.W.2d 194, 195 (Tex. 1963)).
41. Id. at 272.
42. 256 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. 2008).
43. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87.
44. Team Rocket, 256 S.W.3d at 259.
45. Id. at 260.
46. 256 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding).
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the Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on cases involving arbitra-
tion agreements. 47 Further, the supreme court had recently announced
that the issue of waiver (in the context of arbitration provisions) should
be "decided on a case-by-case basis by employing a 'totality of the cir-
cumstances' test."' 48 In this case, the movant contended that the other
party had waived the forum selection clause by: "(1) deposing three wit-
nesses; (2) producing two witnesses for deposition;" (3) exchanging docu-
ment production; and (4) "participating in a temporary injunction
hearing. '49 However, the court of appeals found that this level of activity
did not amount to a waiver of the forum selection clause. 50
V. PARTIES
In In re Union Carbide Corp., the Texas Supreme Court considered
whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to rule on the
defendant's "motion to strike before considering whether to sever the
intervention."'5 1 In this personal injury suit, plaintiff Kenneth Moffett
claimed that he was exposed to toxic chemicals while working at Union
Carbide. The surviving family members of John Hall, who had worked at
Union Carbide and died from myelodysplastic syndrome, intervened in
Moffett's suit. Union Carbide filed a motion to strike the intervention
because the Halls had failed to show they possessed a justiciable interest
in Moffett's suit. Instead of ruling on the motion to strike, the trial court
severed the Halls' claims into a separate suit, which was docketed and
maintained in the same trial court.52 Union Carbide sought mandamus
relief.53
The Texas Supreme Court first noted that TRCP 60 permits a party
with a justiciable interest in a pending law suit to intervene in the law suit
"as a matter of right."'54 Therefore, the supreme court continued, "the
'justiciable interest' requirement is of paramount importance [because] it
defines the category of non-parties who may, without consultation with or
permission from the original parties or the court, interject their interests
into a pending suit to which the intervenors have not been invited. '55
The supreme court concluded that "[t]o constitute a justiciable interest,
'[t]he intervenor's interest must be such that if the original action had
never been commenced, and he had first brought it as the sole plaintiff,
he would have been entitled to recover in his own name to the extent at
least of a part of the relief sought' in the original suit."'56 Here, the court
47. Id. at 884.
48. Id. at 885 (quoting Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2008) (listing factors
to be considered)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 886.




55. Id. at 154-55 (internal quotation omitted).
56. Id. at 155 (quoting King v. Olds, 71 Tex. 729, 12 S.W. 65 (Tex. 1888)).
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found that the Halls had not shown they had a justiciable interest in Mof-
fett's suit, and the trial court had no discretion to deny Union Carbide's
motion to strike. 57
VI. PLEADINGS
In Sells v. Drott, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether the trial
court had properly struck facially valid answers and entered a default
judgment without prior notice to the defendant. 58 In this case, the eighty-
two-year old defendant ostensibly filed both an answer and amended an-
swer pro se. At a severance hearing, which was attended by the defen-
dant's daughter, but not the defendant, the trial court and plaintiff
learned that the daughter had actually signed the defendant's name on
the answer and amended answer. At that same hearing, the trial court
ruled that the answers should be stricken because the daughter was not
authorized to sign, prepare, or file documents on behalf of the defendant,
her mother. However, the Texas Supreme Court held that the pro se an-
swers were facially valid, and the extrinsic evidence showing that the
daughter had signed those answers on behalf of her mother were merely
pleading defects.59 Accordingly, "[b]y appearing in the suit, even with
potentially defective answers, [the defendant] had the right to notice of
a[ny] 'challenge to the validity of the answers' and an opportunity to pre-
sent evidence and argument[s] before th[ose] answers were stricken and a
default judgment granted. '60
In Adams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the Dallas
Court of Appeals considered whether State Farm had been properly iden-
tified as a plaintiff in prior petitions, so as to avoid a limitations defense. 61
On March 28, 2003, the individual plaintiff filed his original petition aris-
ing out of a December 11, 2002, car accident. Although State Farm was
not identified as a plaintiff in the caption or preamble, the petition con-
tained the following provision: "This action is brought in part by State
Farm Mutual Auto Ins[urance] Co[mpany], subrogee to all recovery in
excess of $250.00 and who prays for judgment in its name. '62 The first
amended petition, filed September 23, 2004, also contained this para-
graph, but still did not list State Farm in the caption or preamble. Finally,
the second amended petition filed on March 9, 2005, did identify State
Farm in the caption and preamble, this time as the sole plaintiff. In re-
sponse, one of the defendants asserted that State Farm had not formally
appeared as a plaintiff until the second amended petition was filed, and
that its claims were now barred by limitations. The Dallas Court of Ap-
57. Id. The court also held that mandamus relief was appropriate since the procedure
for random assignment of cases, which is designed to prevent forum shopping, would be
circumvented otherwise. Id. at 157.
58. 259 S.W.3d 156 (Tex. 2008).
59. Id. at 159.
60. Id.
61. 264 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
62. Id. at 426-27.
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peals disagreed and held that State Farm was sufficiently identified as a
plaintiff in the body of the petition to invoke its causes of action.63
VII. DISCOVERY
Depositions were the topic of several significant opinions during the
Survey period. In re BP Products North America, Inc. involved the en-
forcement of an agreement "governing what is commonly referred to as
an 'apex' deposition. ' 64 In the continuing litigation saga arising out of an
explosion at BP Products' Texas City refinery, the plaintiffs sought to
take the depositions of two high-ranking corporate officers of BP Prod-
ucts' parent company, including its chief executive officer, John Browne.
After two trial court orders on motions for protection and one prior man-
damus proceeding, the parties reached an agreement to produce one of-
ficer for a four-hour deposition, in return for which the notice of
Browne's deposition would be withdrawn and would not be re-noticed
unless the agreed-upon deposition revealed that he had "unique and su-
perior personal knowledge.' '65 Moreover, the agreement provided that, if
Browne's deposition was required, it would only be for one hour and
would be taken by telephone. After the first officer's deposition was
taken, however, Browne made several public comments about the Texas
City explosion, and the plaintiffs once again noticed his deposition to
take place in Galveston. BP Products filed another motion for protective
order, which was denied by the trial court.6 6
On petition for writ of mandamus, the Texas Supreme Court noted that
it had never before addressed the scope of a trial court's power to set
aside a discovery agreement that was otherwise valid under TRCP
191.1.6 7 The supreme court stated that "[d]iscovery agreements serve an
important role in efficient trial management" and should not be lightly
set aside, particularly when one party has already performed its obliga-
tions thereunder. 68 Finding that Browne's public statements did not sup-
port a finding that the TRCP 191.1 agreement was fraudulently induced,
or that BP Products was estopped from enforcing it, the supreme court
held that the trial court abused its discretion by setting it aside.69
The Texas Supreme Court also resolved a split in the courts of appeal
63. Id. at 427.
64. 244 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2008). The apex doctrine protects high corporate officials
from depositions unless they have "unique or superior personal knowledge of relevant
facts" or the requesting party demonstrates that the deposition may "lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence" and "less intrusive methods of discovery are ... inadequate." Id.
at 843 n.2 (quoting In re Alcatel U.S.A., Inc., 11 S.W.3d 173, 176 (Tex. 2000)).
65. Id. at 843.
66. Id.
67. TEX. R. Civ. P. 191.1; BP Products, 244 S.W.3d at 846.
68. BP Products, 244 S.W.3d at 846.
69. Id. at 847-48. The court went on to explain that the trial court would have been
authorized to order the one-hour telephone deposition of Browne contemplated by the
parties' agreement, based on the other officer's inability to answer certain questions posed
to him. Id. at 848. The trial court could not, however, order Browne's deposition to pro-
ceed without the agreed-upon limitations. Id.
20091
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on the availability of presuit depositions under TRCP 20270 in health care
liability cases.71 Under the 2003 tort reform legislation, discovery with
respect to a "health care liability claim" is generally stayed until the
plaintiff has filed an expert report, with the exception of specified discov-
ery for the purpose of obtaining medical or hospital records. 72 The su-
preme court held that this stay provision applies to TRCP 202 depositions
as well, rejecting the argument that the term "health care liability claim"
refers only to claims that have already been filed. 73 Instead, the supreme
court construed the statute to extend to causes of action, whether filed or
unfiled, and held that a presuit deposition to "investigate a potential
claim against a health-care provider" is prohibited by section 74.351(s) of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.74 Moreover, the supreme
court rejected the real party in interest's argument that this construction
would lead to absurd results and deter attorneys from filing such suits,
reasoning that these issues were part of the policy judgment made by the
Texas Legislature in enacting the statute. 75
In In re Turner, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that the trial court
abused its discretion in ordering a party to the underlying lawsuit, Paul
Turner, to travel from his home in Hong Kong to Dallas for a deposi-
tion.76 The court of appeals stated that "a party cannot be forced to
travel internationally when alternative means of taking the deposition are
adequate. '77 In this case, a telephone deposition would have been ade-
quate.78 Practitioners would be wise, however, not to read this ruling too
broadly. The court of appeals appears to have been influenced heavily by
the fact that Turner was a nominal, albeit necessary, party, and that only
one of the numerous other parties to the suit was seeking his deposition
for reasons that were vague at best.79
Discovery of electronic "metadata" was at issue in In re Honza.80 In
this case, the plaintiff sought discovery of the metadata on defendants'
computer hard drives, which it alleged was relevant to its claim that de-
fendants had altered a written assignment after the parties reached agree-
ment, but before the document was executed. The trial court entered an
70. TEX. R. Civ. P. 202.
71. In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. 2008).
72. Id. at 420 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(s) (Vernon Supp.
2008)).
73. Jorden, 249 S.W.3d at 421-22.
74. See id. at 422.
75. Id. at 424. Justice O'Neill separately concurred, stating that she would leave open
the possibility that a trial judge has the discretion to order a TRCP 202 deposition if the
discovery methods available under section 74.351(s) are utilized, but fail to yield the neces-
sary information, e.g., if the medical records are missing or indecipherable. See id.
(O'Neill, J., concurring).
76. In re Turner, 243 S.W.3d 843 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2008, orig. proceeding).
77. Id. at 847.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. In re Honza, 242 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, orig. proceeding). Metadata
is electronically stored information that describes "the history, tracking, or management of
an electronic file." Id. at n.4 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note).
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order requiring the defendants to permit a forensic expert to create a
mirror image of the hard drives that he could then inspect to locate two
specific documents or iterations of those documents. Finding no Texas
cases on point, the Waco Court of Appeals looked to federal and other
states' case law, from which it concluded a fairly uniform approach to this
type of discovery request had emerged.81 Specifically, the court first
noted that courts have consistently held that this type of metadata is dis-
coverable. 82 Second, the court adopted the generally-followed protocol
of allowing a third-party expert to make a mirror image of the hard drive
and, subject to the terms of a protective order prohibiting disclosure of
confidential or privileged information, to compile the documents or par-
tial documents retrieved from the hard drive. 83 These materials are then
provided first to the party resisting discovery, who has the opportunity to
review them, produce what is responsive, and create a privilege log for
those it withholds. 84
In In re Does 1-10, the plaintiff filed suit against ten John Does it
claimed had defamed it by posting comments on an internet blog set up
by Doe 1.85 At the same time it filed suit, the plaintiff filed an ex parte
request for a trial court order directing Doe l's internet service provider
(ISP) to disclose the identity of the Does. The trial court granted this
request and entered an order agreed to by plaintiff and the ISP. Doe 1
then filed a petition for writ of mandamus, which the Texarkana Court of
Appeals conditionally granted. In doing so, the court of appeals first held
that the federal Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, which con-
tains a safe harbor for a cable operator's disclosure of information pursu-
ant to a court order, does not itself provide a procedural vehicle by which
a party can obtain such an order from a Texas state court.86 The court
then examined whether there was any basis for the trial court's order
under state law. After a thorough review of the history of bills of discov-
ery in Texas, the court concluded that Texas courts generally do not have
inherent authority to order discovery outside the procedures provided by
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 87
The confidentiality of arbitration materials was at issue in Knapp v.
Wilson N. Jones Memorial Hospital.88 The defendant-hospital in this em-
ployment case alleged that the plaintiff had been terminated for cause
due to financial improprieties. The hospital had previously filed an arbi-
tration claim against its auditors based on these same improprieties and
obtained an arbitration award. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the
trial court erred in ruling that documents and testimony from the arbitra-
81. Id. at 581.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 582.
84. Id.
85. 242 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, orig. proceeding).
86. Id. at 814.
87. Id. at 817-18.
88. 281 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
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tion proceeding were confidential and not discoverable. The Dallas Court
of Appeals agreed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to allow discovery of the depositions, testimony, and witness
statements from the arbitration.89 The court held that, "despite the pub-
lic policy favoring arbitration" and the rules protecting its confidentiality,
"there is an equally important public policy to preserve significant . . .
procedural and substantive rights" of litigants.90 Because the plaintiff
was not seeking to disturb the arbitration award or establish any further
liability on the part of the auditors, but instead sought the information
only to adequately represent his interests in separate litigation with the
hospital, the confidentiality protection normally accorded arbitration
would yield.
VIII. DISMISSAL
In Forrester v. Ginn, the trial court sent a notice of intent to dismiss for
want of prosecution, following which the appellants filed a motion to re-
tain.91 The trial court granted the motion to retain, but stated in the re-
tention order that the case would only be retained for sixty days.
Approximately five months later, the trial court dismissed the action on
its own motion for want of prosecution without notice to the appellants.
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston held that even
though the retention order stated a sixty-day retention limitation, the ap-
pellants were nonetheless entitled to notice before the trial court dis-
missed the case for want of prosecution. 92
In DC Controls v. UM Capital L.L.C., the Dallas Court of Appeals set
aside default judgments against two defendants where the trial court had
previously dismissed the case for want of prosecution, and then reinstated
it.93 The court of appeals noted that at the time one defendant was
served, the case had been dismissed and not yet reinstated, and it was
impossible to serve citation in a case that had been dismissed. 94 Moreo-
ver, although the other defendant was served before the case was dis-
missed, she had no reason to answer the suit, absent a notice that the trial
court intended to reinstate the case.95
The Amarillo Court of Appeals addressed the interplay between a no-
tice of nonsuit in one case, and the defense of res judicata in a subsequent
action between the same parties involving the same facts, in Joachim v.
The Travelers Insurance Co. 96 In this dispute, the plaintiff sued Travelers,
asserting an uninsured motorist claim. The plaintiff then nonsuited his
89. Id. at 177.
90. Id. at 173.
91. 282 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008), rev'd, 282 S.W.3d 430
(Tex. 2009)).
92. Id. at 518.
93. No. 05-07-1728-CV, 2008 WL 4648422 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 22, 2008, no pet.).
94. Id. at *2.
95. Id. at *3.
96. 279 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. filed).
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case without prejudice while no claims for affirmative relief, sanctions, or
fees had been asserted by Travelers. The trial court did not enter an or-
der granting the nonsuit as it should have, but subsequently signed an
order dismissing the action with prejudice for want of prosecution. The
plaintiff claimed it did not receive notice of the trial court's intent to dis-
miss for want of prosecution, or of the order of dismissal with prejudice.
The plaintiff then filed a new action against Travelers based on the same
facts, and Travelers successfully moved for summary judgment based on
res judicata. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the dismissal
with prejudice for want of prosecution was void because the prior nonsuit
was effective when filed, and the entry of the dismissal order without
prejudice was strictly ministerial. 97
IX. JURY PRACTICE
In Davis v. Fisk Electric Co., the Texas Supreme Court revisited the
issue of Batson challenges. 98 In this race discrimination case, the su-
preme court reversed a defense verdict, finding that the defendant's
stated reasons for striking minority jurors were pretextual. The supreme
court first held that the trial court erred in overruling the plaintiff's chal-
lenge to the defendant's peremptory strikes without providing the plain-
tiff an opportunity to rebut the defendant's proffered race-neutral
reasons for striking six panel members, five of whom were African Amer-
ican, and all of whom were minorities. 9 9 The supreme court held that
Batson requires the trial court to provide the challenging party with an
opportunity to contest the stated reasons for striking a juror before ruling
on the challenge.10 0
As to the substance of the Batson challenge itself, the supreme court
first undertook a statistical analysis of the defendant's peremptory strikes
as compared to the entire jury pool, noting that the defendant struck 83%
of the eligible African American panel members (five), but only 5.5% of
the eligible non-black prospective jurors (one), which statistic the su-
preme court found troubling in itself.1 0 ' The supreme court next ad-
dressed the subject of nonverbal behavior as a ground for striking jurors,
holding that where such behavior is relied upon, the conduct at issue
should be proved and reflected in the appellate record where it can be
reviewed. 10 2 This proof can come from the bench, if observed by the trial
court, the juror's own acknowledgment, or "may be otherwise borne out
by the record" with a detailed explanation of the nonverbal conduct at
issue; however, the record must contain some evidence to support or con-
firm the veracity of the challenged nonverbal conduct. 10 3 Finally, the su-
97. Id. at 816-18.
98. 268 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. 2008).
99. Id. at 514-15.
100. Id. at 515.
101. See id. at 516.
102. Id. at 516-18.
103. Id. at 518.
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preme court observed that the defendant did not strike several non-
minority panel members who had voiced opinions similar to those of the
stricken minority panel-members on points articulated by the defendant
as the bases for making its strikes. 104
In Living Centers of Texas, Inc. v. Penalver, the Texas Supreme Court
held that an uninvited argument made during closing argument by the
plaintiffs' counsel, which analogized the defendant's treatment of patients
in a nursing home to treatment of prisoners in World War II concentra-
tion camps, constituted harmful and incurable error.'0 5 Accordingly, the
supreme court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.' 0 6
In Murff v. Pass, the appellant claimed that the trial court erred in re-
fusing to disqualify a jury panel member who stated during voir dire that
he would hold the plaintiff to a higher burden of proof than the law re-
quired, i.e., "clear and convincing" versus "preponderance of the evi-
dence. 10 7 The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to disqualify the potential
juror because he had been asked confusing questions in voir dire about
the proper standard of proof.10 8 Additionally, the record did not demon-
strate that the panel member "harbored bias or prejudice in favor of or
against a party or claim," or that he was "unable or unwilling to follow
the court's instructions." 10 9
In Siller v. LPP Mortgage, Ltd., involving allegations of a wrongful
foreclosure, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the trial court
erred in refusing to grant a new trial where one of the jurors advised the
court after the close of evidence that she had been present during the
disputed foreclosure at the courthouse steps. 110 During voir dire, none of
the jurors admitted to having had any knowledge of the case; however,
after hearing the facts of the dispute, one juror's memory was apparently
"jolted" into recalling that she had been present when the foreclosure
sale occurred."' The trial court refused to disqualify the juror or order a
new trial, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the juror was a
fact witness to a key factual dispute and, therefore, met the definition of a
disqualified juror. Because the verdict was ten to two and the juror in
question had been one of the ten, the error was harmful, thus warranting
a new trial."12
The Dallas Court of Appeals in In re State Farm Lloyds granted a writ
of mandamus, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in entering
an order prohibiting counsel from interviewing jurors discharged after a
104. Id. at 523-24.
105. 256 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. 2008).
106. Id. at 681-82.
107. 249 S.W.3d 407 (Tex. 2008).
108. Id. at 409.
109. Id. at 411.
110. 264 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.).
111. Id. at 330.
112. Id.
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mistrial. 113 The court found the trial court's order constituted an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint of free speech in the absence of any findings of
"imminent and irreparable harm to the judicial process," and that the
trial court's order did not constitute the least restrictive means possible to
prevent any perceived harm.1 14
X. JURY CHARGE
In Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, the Texas Supreme Court reversed a
plaintiff's verdict, holding that the Texas Pattern Jury Charge's (PJC) def-
inition of "producing cause" in a product defect case is incorrect. 11 5 Spe-
cifically, the current PJC asks only if a condition of the product renders it
unreasonably dangerous, but fails to distinguish between design and man-
ufacturing defects.1 6 It fails to include a requirement that a manufactur-
ing defect must deviate from its specifications or planned output in a
manner that renders the product unreasonably dangerous for the manu-
facturer to be held liable.1 1 7 Without further evidence, therefore, a jury
could conclude that any defect in a product when it leaves the manufac-
turer satisfies the PJC's test for a manufacturing defect, without distin-
guishing between deficiencies in the design versus the manufacturing
process.1 18 This omission presents a danger that the jury could impose
liability for what now, in effect, was a design defect, without any evidence
or finding of a safer alternative design.11 9
In DiGiuseppe v. Lawler, the Texas Supreme Court held that to suc-
ceed on a claim for specific performance, the buyer must both plead and
prove that he is "ready, willing, and able" to perform under the con-
tract.1 20 Although the appellant-buyer in this case had pled he was
"ready, willing, and able" to perform under the contract, the facts ad-
duced at trial were contested regarding whether the buyer actually had
the ability to purchase the property, and the jury was not asked to make a
determination on that issue. The supreme court held that, absent conclu-
sive proof or a finding that the buyer was ready, willing, and able to per-
form, the buyer was not entitled to specific performance under the
contract.12 1 Moreover, the supreme court rejected the buyer's argument
that such a finding could be deemed in his favor under TRCP 279,122
reasoning that the jury's express finding that he complied with the con-
tract was not "necessarily referable" to his specific performance ground
of recovery.1 23
113. 254 S.W.3d 632 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding.).
114. Id. at 636.
115. 242 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2007).




120. 269 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. 2008).
121. Id. at 598.
122. TEX. R. Civ. P. 279.




In a case of first impression, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
res judicata effect of an administrative decision by the Texas Workforce
Commission (TWC) under the Texas Payday Law 124 in Igal v. Brightstar
Information Technology Group, Inc.125 In this employment dispute the
plaintiff claimed that his employer had breached an employment agree-
ment and owed him post-termination salary. Rather than filing suit, the
plaintiff initially filed a claim for unpaid wages under the Texas Payday
Law. Ultimately, the TWC concluded that the plaintiff's claims failed on
the merits, and that the TWC lacked jurisdiction over the dispute because
the claims were untimely. The plaintiff then filed an action in state dis-
trict court, and the defendant successfully moved for summary judgment
based on res judicata. The supreme court affirmed, holding that, al-
though the Texas Payday Law is an alternative (albeit not an exclusive)
mechanism for seeking recovery of unpaid wages, when an administrative
agency such as the TWC acts in a judicial capacity and resolves the dis-
pute before it, res judicata bars relitigation of the claim.126
In Motient Corp. v. Dondero, the Dallas Court of Appeals declined to
give res judicata effect to a prior federal judgment in a case involving the
same facts as the state action.127 In this dispute, Motient filed two suits
the same day against Dondero, the first in federal court, alleging viola-
tions of federal securities laws in connection with a proposed proxy bat-
tle, and the second in state court, alleging breach of fiduciary duty by
Dondero as a director of Motient. The federal district court granted
Dondero's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Dondero then
successfully moved for summary judgment in the state court action based
on res judicata. Although the appellate court agreed that both the state
and federal actions arose out of the same facts, it nonetheless concluded
that res judicata did not apply. After examining several opinions of the
federal district court judge on the subject of supplemental jurisdiction,
the court divined that, had Motient not split its claims against Dondero
and instead filed both its breach of fiduciary duty and securities law
claims against him in federal court, the federal judge would have declined
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the fiduciary duty claims once
he dismissed the federal securities law claims. 128 Therefore, the federal
court was not a court of competent jurisdiction for res judicata
purposes. 29
Finally, in Baylor College of Medicine v. Camberg, the Fourteenth Dis-
trict Court of Appeals in Houston addressed the interplay between a
high-low agreement, under TRCP 11,130 and the entry of a final judgment
124. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 61.001-.095 (Vernon 2008).
125. 250 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. 2008).
126. Id. at 88-89.
127. 269 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
128. Id. at 89-90.
129. Id. at 90.
130. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
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that did not comply with that agreement.131 In this wrongful death case,
the parties reached an agreement during jury deliberations under which
the plaintiff would receive $500,000 if the jury awarded less than that
amount, the actual amount of the award if between $500,000 and $1.1
million, and $1.1 million if the jury awarded that amount or more. The
agreement was dictated into the record and approved by the trial court.
The jury entered a verdict for just under $900,000, and the plaintiff then
moved for an entry of a judgment in that agreement plus prejudgment
interest.132 The defendant filed a motion to enforce the Rule 11 agree-
ment and submitted its own proposed judgment, which excluded any pre-
judgment interest. The trial court entered the plaintiff's judgment based
upon the jury's verdict to include pre-judgment interest.
The defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in enter-
ing a judgment that varied from the Rule 11 agreement. The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that, by the parties' pleadings, the trial court
was notified that the parties no longer consented to the Rule 11 agree-
ment, and, therefore, that it was not authorized to enter a judgment based
upon that agreement.1 33 The court also noted that although the defen-
dant had filed a motion to enforce the Rule 11 agreement, the record did
not indicate that it had taken any additional steps to enforce the agree-
ment, such as filing a motion for summary judgment, or seeking to correct
or reform the judgment. 134 Thus, the defendant did not establish "that
the trial court was precluded from rendering judgment on the jury's
verdict." 135
XII. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
In Arkoma Basin Exploration Co., Inc. v. FMF Associates 1990-A, Ltd.,
the Texas Supreme Court held that a trial court's order suggesting a re-
mittitur restarts the appellate timetables.1 36 In this oil and gas dispute,
the jury found that the defendant had committed fraud, and awarded the
plaintiffs damages, which were reduced following the trial court's remitti-
tur order. Both sides appealed. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed,
except that it held that a part of the remittitur order was improper. The
defendant argued that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to reinstate
the original verdict because the plaintiff's notice of cross appeal had not
been timely filed relative to the date of the original judgment. The su-
preme court disagreed, holding that, unlike a voluntary remittitur, an or-
der that properly suggests a remittitur restarts the appellate deadlines
because it "allows only two options: a smaller judgment or a new trial."'1 37
While it may not be immediately known "which option a claimant will
131. 247 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
132. Id. at 344.
133. Id. at 346-48.
134. Id. at 348.
135. Id. at 349.
136. 249 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. 2008).
137. Id. at 391.
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select, it is immediately clear that the original judgment will change" at
the instance of the court. 138 Accordingly, such orders must restart the
appellate timetables. 139
In In re Baylor Medical Center at Garland, the Texas Supreme Court
overruled one of its prior decisions and held that, so long as a trial court
maintains plenary jurisdiction, it may "ungrant" a prior order granting a
new trial. 140 In this medical malpractice suit, the jury found for the de-
fendant-hospital. Eighty-two days after signing the judgment, the trial
judge granted a motion for new trial based on juror affidavits that the
defendant claimed were inadmissable. Following a tortuous procedural
path, the issue presented to the supreme court was whether the trial judge
had jurisdiction to later vacate that new trial order. Specifically, the su-
preme court had to decide whether to perpetuate the judicially created
rule that a trial court is precluded from vacating a new trial order after "a
deadline based on a purely hypothetical event: the expiration of plenary
power assuming that a vacated judgment had instead become final.' 4'
Finding no sound reason for the unusual rule that had grown up in Texas,
the supreme court held that, as with any other order, a trial court may
reconsider an order granting a new trial as long as a case is still
pending.' 42
In another mandamus proceeding regarding appellate timetables, In re
Brookshire Grocery Co., the Texas Supreme Court held that a motion for
new trial filed within thirty days of a judgment, but after a preceding mo-
tion for new trial has been overruled, does not extend a trial court's ple-
nary power.143 In this tort action, the defendant filed a motion to
disregard the verdict or for a new trial. Thereafter, the trial court entered
judgment on the verdict. The next day, the trial court denied the defen-
dant's motions to disregard and for a new trial. Within thirty days after
the judgment was entered, the defendant filed a second, more detailed
motion for new trial. The trial court granted this second motion more
than thirty days after denying the original motion. The supreme court
noted that TRCP 329b(b) allows amended motions for new trial to be
filed without leave of court provided that "(1) no preceding motion for
new trial has been overruled, and (2) it is filed within thirty days of judg-
ment.' 44 Under TRCP 329b(e), 145 however, only a "timely filed" mo-
tion will operate to extend the trial court's plenary power. 146 Thus, an
amended motion filed after the original motion for new trial has been
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 280 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. 2008) (overruling Porter v. Vick, 888 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1994)).
The court noted that "[n]owhere but Texas can one find a single appellate opinion discuss-
ing when a court can 'ungrant' a motion." Id. at 229.
141. Id. at 230.
142. Id. at 231.
143. 250 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. 2008).
144. Id. at 69 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(b)).
145. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e).
146. Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 70.
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overruled does not extend that trial court's plenary power beyond thirty
days from the date the original motion was denied.147
Finally, in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Erickson, the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals dismissed a restricted appeal for lack of jurisdiction
where the trial court had entered a default judgment against the appel-
lant, and denied its original motion to extend the appellate deadlines
under TRCP 306a, 148 but then granted its second TRCP 306a motion and
motion for new trial. 149 Because these latter motions were granted while
the trial court retained plenary jurisdiction over the case, the court of
appeals concluded there was no final judgment. Specifically, the court
held that nothing in the TRCP "precludes a trial court from reconsidering
its prior ruling" on a TRCP 306a motion, or from granting a second such
motion, while it retains plenary power.150
XIII. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
TRCP 18a(c) provides that a judge subject to a motion to recuse "shall
either recuse himself or request the presiding judge of the administrative
judicial district to assign [another] judge to hear such motion.' u51 If the
judge voluntarily recuses, he must ask "the presiding judge ... to assign
another judge to sit" and must "take no further action in the case except
for good cause stated in the order" taking such action.152 In re McKee
presented the issue of the "validity of an administrative action taken by a
presiding judge of an administrative judicial region after he had volunta-
rily recused [himself] from the case."' 53
In this legal malpractice case, the original trial judge voluntarily re-
cused and Judge Ovard, the presiding judge of the administrative region,
also voluntarily recused and asked the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme
Court to assign a replacement judge. The Chief Justice did so, but when
the original trial judge retired and a new judge (Judge Blake) was elected,
the Chief Justice's appointment was withdrawn.1 54 The defendant law
firm then moved to recuse Judge Blake, who declined to recuse herself
and referred the matter to Judge Ovard to assign a judge to hear the
motion. Despite his prior voluntary recusal, Judge Ovard assigned yet
another judge to hear the recusal motion, which was granted. The plain-
tiff then brought this mandamus proceeding, complaining that Judge
Ovard's prior recusal rendered his assignment order and, in turn, the as-
signed judge's recusal order void. 155
147. Id. at 69.
148. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a.
149. 267 S.W.3d 139, 141 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.).
150. Id. at 149.
151. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(c).
152. Id.
153. 248 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam).




The Texas Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus.1 56 The su-
preme court noted that, "absent extraordinary circumstances, a presiding
judge's order appointing a judge to hear a recusal motion is administra-
tive," not judicial, as "it simply transfers the power to decide the recusal
motion to another judge. ' 157 TRCP 18a(c) provides the authority for
such an assignment, but only if the presiding judge's order contains the
requisite finding of "good cause.' t58 Although Judge Ovard apparently
failed to make any express finding of good cause, the supreme court held
that "'good cause' will ordinarily be inherent in the administrative nature
of that assignment. ' 159 Thus, the supreme court declined to grant manda-
mus relief, stating that, unless there were extraordinary circumstances re-
quiring Judge Ovard's recusal, he needed only to revise his order to
reflect that the assignment was purely administrative in nature. 160
The ruling in McKee should be contrasted with Guilbot v. Estate of
Gonzalez y Vallejo, which held that the presiding judge's order ruling on
his own motion to recuse was void. 161 In Guilbot, a probate court judge
referred a motion to recuse to Judge Herman, the presiding judge of the
statutory probate courts. When Judge Herman assigned another probate
judge, Judge Burwell, to hear the motion, the same parties then moved to
recuse both Judge Herman and Judge Burwell.162 Judge Herman then set
all three motions for hearing before himself and, after hearing, denied all
three. 163
Although the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston was sympa-
thetic to Judge Herman's frustration with the multiple recusal motions, it
nevertheless held that he lacked the authority to decide them, and that he
should have instead referred them to the Chief Justice of the Texas Su-
preme Court for assignment. 164 The court rejected the appellee's argu-
ment analogizing Judge Herman's action to those cases that have
authorized an appellate court to "fashion a remedy" when a party moves
to recuse all of the appellate judges, since in this case Judge Herman had
the readily available alternative of referring the motions to the Chief Jus-
tice. 165 Moreover, the court held that Judge Herman's order was not
saved by the statutory provision allowing a trial judge to continue to act
when faced with a so-called tertiary recusal motion, as that statute applies







161. 267 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. filed).
162. Id. at 559.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 561-62.
165. Id. at 562.
166. Id. at 562-63 (citing TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 30.016 (Vernon 2008)).
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XIV. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
In In re Lopez, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals granted a writ of
mandamus from a disqualification order that was entered without an evi-
dentiary hearing.167 After the plaintiff moved to recuse the trial judge,
the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district, Judge Banales,
presided over the recusal hearing, at which plaintiff's attorney, Richard
Zayas, made his first appearance in the case. Defendant's counsel orally
moved to disqualify Zayas, asserting that Zayas's current law partner had
previously been partners with defendant's attorney during the time the
defendant's attorney was representing defendant. Judge Banales took
these representations by an officer of the court as "facts" and concluded
he did not need any additional evidence before disqualifying Zayas. In
fact, Judge Banales specifically denied plaintiff's request for an eviden-
tiary hearing.' 68
The court of appeals vacated the disqualification order. The court
stated that, if proven, the alleged disqualifying conflict was a significant
one.1 69 Nevertheless, noting that an attorney's unsworn statements are
not evidence, the court held that the severity of the disqualification rem-
edy, and the "exacting standards that the trial court must consider," de-
manded that plaintiff be "afforded notice and a[n evidentiary] hearing
prior to a ruling on the disqualification of her counsel.' 170
XV. MISCELLANEOUS
In re Poly-America, L.P., the Texas Supreme Court considered, as a
matter of first impression, whether discovery limits in arbitration agree-
ments were substantively unconscionable.' 7 1 In this employment dispute,
the arbitration agreement provided that each party may serve a single set
of twenty-five interrogatories (including subparts) and one set of twenty-
five requests for production or inspection of documents or tangible items.
Additionally, the arbitration agreement included the following
limitations:
(1) Each party was limited to a single, six hour deposition;
(2) A prohibition on requests for admissions;
(3) A ban on inquiry into the company's finances; and
(4) A requirement that the parties and their attorneys keep all aspects
of the arbitration confidential.
167. No. 13-08-00518-CV, 2008 WL 4883052 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Nov. 12, 2008,
orig. proceeding).
168. Id. at *5.
169. Id.
170. Id. & n.1. The court also rejected a challenge to its mandamus jurisdiction over
Judge Banales as the presiding judge of the administrative district, reasoning that the rele-
vant question was the capacity in which Judge Banales was proceeding. Because Judge
Banales was hearing the motion to recuse himself, he was acting in his capacity as a district
judge, not his administrative capacity. Id. at *2.
171. 262 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. 2008).
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The employee contended that these limitations made it impossible for
him to prove his claim of retaliatory discharge and, therefore, rendered
the arbitration agreement unconscionable. The supreme court held that
discovery limitations in arbitration agreements are unenforceable if they
prevent effective presentation of the employee's claims. 172 However, the
supreme court also held that because the relevant inquiry depends upon
the facts of a given case and the particular discovery-limitations effect on
the asserted claims, it was doubtful that any trial court-assessing claims
and discovery limitations before arbitration-is in the best position to
accurately determine which limits on discovery will have such impermissi-
ble effect. 173 Thus, the court held that the "assessment of particular dis-
covery needs in a given [arbitration] and, in turn, the enforceability of
[those] limitations," is a determination that should be made by the "arbi-
trator as the case unfolds."'1 74
In Knapp Medical Center v. De La Garza, the Texas Supreme Court
reaffirmed the rule that oral settlement agreements are unenforceable
under TRCP 11.175 In this case, a physician reached a purported settle-
ment of his claims against a hospital during trial. The physician's attorney
claimed that the parties had agreed to settle for the hospital's insurance
policy limits of $1,000,000, and an additional $200,000 which the hospital
would contribute. 176 The hospital's attorneys claimed that, although they
had discussed that the hospital would contribute an additional $200,000,
no agreement had been reached and, in fact, the hospital was not willing
to do so. Despite this disagreement, the physician's attorney agreed on
the record to settle the underlying claims for $1,000,000 while purporting
to reserve his right to collect the additional $200,000 from the hospital in
another lawsuit. The trial court accepted the judgment and discharged
the jury.
Thereafter, the physician sued the hospital for the disputed $200,000,
alleging fraud and breach of oral agreement. The trial court found in
favor of the physician, and the hospital appealed. The Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the oral testimony "was suffi-
cient to support the existence and breach of the settlement agree-
ment."'1 77 The Texas Supreme Court reversed and rendered, however,
finding that the purported settlement was barred by TRCP 11.178 The
supreme court also held, relying on its prior statute of frauds jurispru-
dence, that TRCP 11 likewise barred the physician's fraud claim because
he sought the same benefit of the bargain damages under that claim as he
did on his contract claim.' 79
172. Id. at 358.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11; Knapp Med. Ctr. v. De La Garza, 238 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. 2007).
176. Knapp, 238 S.W.3d at 767-78.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 769.
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In Quinn v. Nafta Traders, Inc., the Dallas Court of Appeals considered
whether parties could contractually expand the scope of [judicial] review
of an arbitrator's decision to include grounds not expressly identified in
the Texas General Arbitration Act (TAA).180 In this case, a company
and its former employee had an arbitration agreement which provided
that "the arbitrator does not have authority (i) to render a decision which
contains a reversible error of state or federal law, or (ii) to apply a cause
of action or remedy not expressly provided for under existing state or
federal law. '181 On appeal, the employee argued that the arbitration
award should be vacated "under the agreement's expanded judicial re-
view because (1) the arbitrator applied the wrong law, (2) there was no or
insufficient evidence of sexual discrimination, (3) it was an abuse of dis-
cretion to award attorney's fees, (4) the award of special damages was
incorrect, and (5) there was no or insufficient evidence of mental
anguish. '182 In other words, the employee argued that the arbitrator
made several errors of law that were subject to judicial review.
Under the TAA, a court must confirm an arbitrator's award on applica-
tion unless an opposing party establishes a statutory ground under the
Act for vacating, modifying, or correcting the award.183 These grounds
include "(1) corruption, fraud, or other undue means, (2) prejudice re-
sulting from arbitrator partiality, corruption, misconduct, or wilful misbe-
havior, (3) arbitrators exceeding their powers, refusing to postpone a
hearing after a showing of good cause, refusing to hear material evidence,
or conducting a hearing contrary to enumerated statutory provisions re-
sulting in substantial prejudice to a party, and (4) absence of an agree-
ment to arbitrate. '184 The court of appeals noted that these grounds
"reflect severe departures from an otherwise proper arbitration process
and are of a completely different character than ordinary legal error." 185
The court held that under these circumstances, and because the statute
did not provide any provision for expansion of judicial review, "parties
seeking judicial review of an arbitration award covered under the TAA
cannot," by agreement, "expand the scope of that review."' 86
180. 257 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. granted).
181. Id. at 797.
182. Id. at 797-98.
183. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.087 (Vernon 2005).
184. Quinn, 257 S.W.3d at 798 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.088
(Vernon 2005)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 799.
20091
994 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
